I have avoided writing about Gilad Shalit for some time, mostly because my thoughts about his situation are jumbled. However, thanks to the urging and support of some friends, here are these thoughts in all their gory glory.
Before we get started, a little background information. Gilad Shalit is an Israeli soldier who was captured on June 25, 2006 on Israeli soil and has been held in Gaza by Hamas since then. He was 20 years old upon his capture and is now 23.
Hamas has not allowed international aid groups to visit him although they did release a video of Shalit this October in exchange for 20 female Palestinian detainees. Recent negotiations may result in the release of as many as 1,000 Palestinian detainees in exchange for Shalit's release.
The internal Israeli debate over the merits of the potential exchange is intense and incredibly emotional. This is one aspect of the conflict that is, in my opinion, not fully understood in the US. Then again, I am not sure it is possible for Americans to truly understand the emotional complexity of these issues since we lack direct experience.
For example, the US has a firm policy regarding terrorism; we do not negotiate with terrorists. Every American knows this if only from movies and TV shows. In a vacuum, this is the optimal policy. As one can see, paying ransoms, whether in the form of prisoners or money, simply begets more kidnapping. However, American military service is not analogous to Israeli military service because the US has a volunteer army and Israel does not.
The moral and morale calculus radically shifts when a nation's soldiers are not volunteers. American soldiers all signed up for service knowing that the US would not negotiate with, say, al Qaeda for their release if they were captured. However, Israeli soldiers are drafted. There are real, tangible negative consequences if one refuses military service and, consequently, benefits if one does serve.
There are good reasons why Israel chooses to use the coercive power of the state to push people toward military service. But the fact remains that coercion is necessary. The state has, by extension, greater responsibility to ensure their safety.
Everyone in Israel agrees that Gilad Shalit must return home. The argument is about the cost. Hundreds of the 1,000 Palestinian detainees named in the exchange already have Israeli blood on their hands. They have directly participated in killing Israelis either through planning or violent action. Thus, some have concluded that the release of such people would only lead to the death and/or capture of even more Israelis, making the entire exchange a colossal risk with no upside and a huge downside. In their eyes, the cost is too great.
But Gilad Shalit is more than a single Israeli soldier. He is not merely the son of Mr. and Mrs. Shalit. He is, in a way, everyone's son. All Israeli parents know that he could be their child. And if you were Gilad Shalit's parents, wouldn't you give up anything to get him back?
In purely pragmatic terms, it may also be important to troop morale for the IDF to secure Shalit's freedom. There are many Israeli soldiers who serve out of a sense of duty or obligation and nothing more. If given a choice, they certainly would not be soldiers. In exchange for this service, the IDF promises that it will do anything possible to make sure no soldier is left behind.
If the IDF reneges on this promise, then morale may be compromised. Non-service, already a problem, may increase. So to prevent further erosion of popular support and troop morale, any price is worth paying.
To be honest, I did not understand the visceral nature of this dilemma until very recently. It seemed like a fairly obvious decision from my detached American point of view. No negotiating with terrorists, period, end of story. 1,000 detainees for one guy? Um, are you kidding?
But as I heard Israelis debate the issue, my certainty gave way to doubt and, as I write, a sense of tearing, of being torn in two directions. It is not necessarily a separation of heart and mind. My mind and heart are truthfully divided neatly in two, with half of my heart siding with one side of my mind against the other halves. Do you let a young man go through a certain future of captivity and pain, or do you potentially condemn others to die in his place?
In some situations, distance gives perspective. But such decisions are not made by objective observers, blessed with emotional distance. They are made by those in the swirl, buffeted by tides of pain and passion and fear and love. It is so easy for those with little lose to give sage advice preaching patience and fortitude and calm resolve, to warn against giving in to anger. But it is far harder to follow that path when it is you who could lose everything.
This is why I have avoided writing about Gilad Shalit. My thoughts are drowned out by my frustration. Frustration that we live in a world where such choices must be made. Frustration that so few outside of Israel understand how difficult these decisions truly are. Frustration that I can be nothing more than frustrated.
So there you go. I hope this sparks some conversation in the United States and perhaps, help some of you understand this situation a little better.
Showing posts with label Hamas. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Hamas. Show all posts
Saturday, December 5, 2009
Sunday, November 29, 2009
Magic: The Gathering, Baseball, and the Dynamics of the Arab-Israeli Conflict
One of my passions is gaming, a hobby that is useless at first glance. But as I've gotten older (and perhaps more delusional), some of the ideas found within games apply to greater issues. This particular post is going to deal with a couple truisms, the first oft-repeated in Magic: The Gathering circles. It goes like this: "There are no wrong threats, only wrong answers."
For those who don't know what Magic: The Gathering is, it is a collectible card game (CCG) in which two or more players are magicians fighting for dominance. They use decks of spells to fight each other, with the goal of either exhausting the other player's deck completely or, more commonly, reducing the opponent's life total to zero.
There are many ways to achieve this goal, but only two apply to the Arab-Israeli conflict. The first is an aggressive strategy, where a player normally uses cheap spells to overwhelm the opponent's defenses and win before slower decks can establish dominance. The second is a control strategy, where a player tries to answer the opponent's early threats to get to the late game, when the control player normally has a few powerful but expensive spells that end the game.
Right now, I would classify Israel as the control player and the Arab actors as the aggressive player. Israel is a nation-state that has been fighting for its existence since its inception. Its stance is overwhelming defensive; Israel tries to identify threats and neutralize them while essentially eschewing truly aggressive strategies.
The Arab actors thrust themselves into the aggressive role with the invasion of Israel in 1947 and have continued to present new threats. These threats ranged from the conventional (1967 War) to the unconventional (suicide bombings). Most recently, they have launched public relations salvos aimed to erode Israel's standing in the world community and thus, the legitimacy of its ability to bring military force to bear.
Israel has, to this point, found the right answers to the existential threats presented. The IDF is one of the strongest, most resilient fighting forces in the world and has delivered a string of decisive military victories against superior forces.
However, to bring in another of my favorite sayings, this time from baseball, "Past performance is no guarantee of future success." The IDF is fantastically well-equipped to deal with conventional military conflicts. On the way back from a trip to the north this week, we drove by a tank exercise. Dozens of tanks stood in formation on a field. It was an intimidating sight and not something any conventional army would want to see across the battlefield.
But this only highlights that the threat profile has changed and formerly effective answers may no longer be relevant. Few, if any, of the battles Israel will face in the next ten years will take place on an open field. Tanks, while wonderful blunt force instruments, are little use in urban settings where civilian casualties must be minimized. Those tanks may serve as a deterrent to aggression by Israel's neighbors but do little to stop rocket fire coming from Gaza.
If this were a game of Magic: The Gathering, Israel would have already won. They found the answers to their opponents' early threats, established a dominant position, and have the overwhelming force necessary to destroy their opposition (for the Magic players out there, a few quick swings by a Morphling or Baneslayer Angel would be an appropriate analogue). If this were a baseball game, it would 25-0 and the fans would already be heading for the exits.
But this isn't a game where the goal is to kill your enemy at all costs, morality and consequences be damned, or one that ends after a set number of innings. Israel cannot, for a variety of good reasons, commit genocide to ensure its safety, nor can it simply hold on until it gets 27 outs. Instead, Israel must try to maintain its position while dealing with the new threats its opponent poses. Israel spends a huge amount of human and economic capital on maintaining control, costs that take their toll on Israeli society. Yet these costs must be paid because the next threat, the one they cannot answer, may destroy everything for which they have worked.
By comparison, organizations like Hamas have little to lose. If one threat fails, they find another. And if that fails, well, they just keep plugging away. All of these threats are relatively cheap and force their opponent to spend a large amount of resources to find solutions. One example I mentioned in a previous post is the Qassam rocket fire aimed at Sderot. Each Qassam is easy to make, sometimes composed from aid materials and thus incredibly cheap, and capable of inflicting fear and death. To deal with this persistent threat, Israel has spent hundreds of millions of dollars on bomb shelters while incurring economic losses due to mental health issues and infrastructure damage, to name a few.
I do admit that I find Israeli paranoia problematic, especially since it complicates the peace process and leads to the occasional police harassment I have encountered. However, this paranoia stems, in part, from a gut understanding of two old truisms: There are no wrong threats, only wrong answers, and past performance is no guarantee of future success. Just because Israel has always found the answers before does not mean they will always do so in the future. And one stumble could lead to the end.
Or, to stretch my metaphors to the absolute edge of breaking, they are stuck in a baseball game that does not end until both teams decide to call it a day. And we all know how that turns out.
For those who don't know what Magic: The Gathering is, it is a collectible card game (CCG) in which two or more players are magicians fighting for dominance. They use decks of spells to fight each other, with the goal of either exhausting the other player's deck completely or, more commonly, reducing the opponent's life total to zero.
There are many ways to achieve this goal, but only two apply to the Arab-Israeli conflict. The first is an aggressive strategy, where a player normally uses cheap spells to overwhelm the opponent's defenses and win before slower decks can establish dominance. The second is a control strategy, where a player tries to answer the opponent's early threats to get to the late game, when the control player normally has a few powerful but expensive spells that end the game.
Right now, I would classify Israel as the control player and the Arab actors as the aggressive player. Israel is a nation-state that has been fighting for its existence since its inception. Its stance is overwhelming defensive; Israel tries to identify threats and neutralize them while essentially eschewing truly aggressive strategies.
The Arab actors thrust themselves into the aggressive role with the invasion of Israel in 1947 and have continued to present new threats. These threats ranged from the conventional (1967 War) to the unconventional (suicide bombings). Most recently, they have launched public relations salvos aimed to erode Israel's standing in the world community and thus, the legitimacy of its ability to bring military force to bear.
Israel has, to this point, found the right answers to the existential threats presented. The IDF is one of the strongest, most resilient fighting forces in the world and has delivered a string of decisive military victories against superior forces.
However, to bring in another of my favorite sayings, this time from baseball, "Past performance is no guarantee of future success." The IDF is fantastically well-equipped to deal with conventional military conflicts. On the way back from a trip to the north this week, we drove by a tank exercise. Dozens of tanks stood in formation on a field. It was an intimidating sight and not something any conventional army would want to see across the battlefield.
But this only highlights that the threat profile has changed and formerly effective answers may no longer be relevant. Few, if any, of the battles Israel will face in the next ten years will take place on an open field. Tanks, while wonderful blunt force instruments, are little use in urban settings where civilian casualties must be minimized. Those tanks may serve as a deterrent to aggression by Israel's neighbors but do little to stop rocket fire coming from Gaza.
If this were a game of Magic: The Gathering, Israel would have already won. They found the answers to their opponents' early threats, established a dominant position, and have the overwhelming force necessary to destroy their opposition (for the Magic players out there, a few quick swings by a Morphling or Baneslayer Angel would be an appropriate analogue). If this were a baseball game, it would 25-0 and the fans would already be heading for the exits.
But this isn't a game where the goal is to kill your enemy at all costs, morality and consequences be damned, or one that ends after a set number of innings. Israel cannot, for a variety of good reasons, commit genocide to ensure its safety, nor can it simply hold on until it gets 27 outs. Instead, Israel must try to maintain its position while dealing with the new threats its opponent poses. Israel spends a huge amount of human and economic capital on maintaining control, costs that take their toll on Israeli society. Yet these costs must be paid because the next threat, the one they cannot answer, may destroy everything for which they have worked.
By comparison, organizations like Hamas have little to lose. If one threat fails, they find another. And if that fails, well, they just keep plugging away. All of these threats are relatively cheap and force their opponent to spend a large amount of resources to find solutions. One example I mentioned in a previous post is the Qassam rocket fire aimed at Sderot. Each Qassam is easy to make, sometimes composed from aid materials and thus incredibly cheap, and capable of inflicting fear and death. To deal with this persistent threat, Israel has spent hundreds of millions of dollars on bomb shelters while incurring economic losses due to mental health issues and infrastructure damage, to name a few.
I do admit that I find Israeli paranoia problematic, especially since it complicates the peace process and leads to the occasional police harassment I have encountered. However, this paranoia stems, in part, from a gut understanding of two old truisms: There are no wrong threats, only wrong answers, and past performance is no guarantee of future success. Just because Israel has always found the answers before does not mean they will always do so in the future. And one stumble could lead to the end.
Or, to stretch my metaphors to the absolute edge of breaking, they are stuck in a baseball game that does not end until both teams decide to call it a day. And we all know how that turns out.
Sunday, September 13, 2009
I'm back! (and another speaker analysis)
First, I must apologize for the break between posts. We finally received internet access in our apartments a few days ago; apparently, our building was still living in the 1980s and lacked internet wiring. Thankfully that situation has been rectified and the blog can resume with some assistance from Amy since she provided a copy of the Fellowship's itinerary. Onward!
After leaving Sderot, we had a wonderful BBQ on the beach and tried to finally jettison all of our jet lag. The next morning was still a bit dazed but it was certainly better than the reality collapse of the first couple days.
Our day started with a "60 Minutes" segment called "Is Peace Out of Reach?" In it, Bob Simon talks to various Israelis and Palestinians about the peace process, generally outlines the shape of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and visits the West Bank. There are many problems with this piece, particularly Simon's "analysis" of demography and Israel's options in keeping a Jewish majority in the face of a rapidly growing Palestinian minority. The quote speaks for itself:
"Demographers predict that within ten years Arabs will outnumber Jews in Israel, the West Bank and Gaza. Without a separate Palestinian state the Israelis would have three options, none of them good. They could try ethnic cleansing, drive the Palestinians out of the West Bank, or they could give the Palestinians the vote. That would be the democratic option but it would mean the end of the Jewish state. Or they could try apartheid - have the minority Israelis rule the majority Palestinians, but apartheid regimes don’t have a very long life."
This is a ridiculously short, absurd, and incomplete list of Israel's options. My biggest issue is that the demography is incorrect. As of 2008, Israel proper's Arab citizenry comprised about 20% of the nation's total population, and about 12% of the Arab population considers itself Israeli before Arab. It should be pretty clear that Arabs will not be the majority within a single decade, let alone two or three. Therefore, there is a lot of time before any of these "options" become necessary. This kind of demographic fear-mongering is currently popular in Israel and in the US, where racists worry about whites only being the plurality but hardly reflects the reality on the ground. More importantly, this list of options does not illuminate or explain the current situation in any way. All it does is inflame and antagonize.
Israel isn't going to try ethnic cleansing. This "option" has been available through Israel's entire history and after the 1948 War, there hasn't been any movement in that direction. Giving Palestinians the vote would not necessarily mean the end of the Jewish state, particularly if it is coupled with a two state solution, or at least a stabilization of the West Bank. Continued Jewish immigration from outside Israel and the natural growth of Israel's population should render discussions of an apartheid state moot until we are actually at that point decades from now. As an added bonus, Simon fails to mention the state in which Palestinians truly live under an apartheid regime - Jordan, with its ruling Hashemite minority and subjugated Palestinian majority.
If you truly believe that mainstream Israelis would support ethnic cleansing (hint: they wouldn't, and the crazy settlers don't count as mainstream, Bob), then there's not much to talk about. The Israeli settler Simon speaks to early on in the piece represents the far right fringe of the settler movement, which should key you in on how crazy she is. Then, in a neat bit of "balance," Simon finds the most moderate, least representative Palestinian he could find and tries to portray his position as the Palestinian mainstream. I could continue to tear into Simon's superficial and, honestly, unbalanced portrayal of the situation but the bias is evident from that one quote alone. And as those who know me well can attest, I am sick to death of whining about media bias against Israel but it is so obvious here that it cannot be overlooked.
After this somewhat dismal foray into American media, we heard from a representative of Palestinian Media Watch, an ostensible "self portrait of Palestinian society" (quote taken from their old website). PMW analyzes Palestinian society through its media, such as television, academic papers, and maps. The PMW representative (whose name I cannot recall, although she seemed very nice and earnest) showed clips including children's shows from Hamas' state television station and statements from Fatah, PLO, and Hamas leaders.
The bits from children's shows had the most effect on our group; several people audibly responded when the Hamas mascot, modeled after Mickey Mouse, was questioned and murdered by an "Israeli soldier" (an actor, obviously) on live air with a Palestinian child providing commentary. These shows also include game shows in which Palestinian children answer questions like "What is the size of Palestine?" (answer: 27,000 sq. km., the size of all of Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza). Combined with excerpts from Palestinian textbooks, the PMW representative argued that the Palestinians were creating a fictional world without Israel for their children, with the goal of eventually wiping Israel off the map for real.
To further convince us of Fatah and Hamas' true goal of destroying Israel, she continued with clips from various leaders who either rejected Israel's legitimacy, swore to wipe Israel from the map, or drive all the Jews into the sea. This, she said, showed that even at the highest levels of Palestinian leadership, the destruction of Israel and the expulsion of Jews remained the true goal.
I remain skeptical of these assertions. It is common practice for politicians in the Middle East to make all sorts of wild claims (see also: Mahmoud Ahmadinejad) that they cannot enforce and/or do not actually believe. All such declarations must be taken with mountains of salt. Plus, in some negotiations, the weaker your position, the more absurd your demands. Hamas and Fatah do not and will not have the capacity to overcome the IDF and wipe Israel off the map in any conceivable scenario. Once you view all public declarations of Israel's impending doom as simply the strongest position available, they make more sense.
Also, analyzing any political situation through state-controlled media is intrinsically problematic. North Korean media is a great example since it is also state-controlled and borderline insane. While Palestinian officials claim that they're going to destroy Israel, North Korea issues posters like this (source: http://calitreview.com/):
http://www.robpongi.com/pages/comboFUCKINGUSAHI.html
Obviously, neither reflects reality nor do they reflect what the political leaders actually believe will happen. Kim Jong Il (or his successor) no more believes that North Korea can destroy the US than Mahmoud Abbas believes the Palestinians can destroy Israel. This should be fairly obvious by the actions of such leaders, with North Korea constantly approaching and retreating from the negotiating table and Fatah working with Israel in the West Bank and against Hamas. It's actually in Abbas' best interest for Israel to remain strong or else Hamas would likely destroy Fatah, execute Abbas, and take over the West Bank, a disastrous outcome all around, particularly for Abbas and his family.
It is true that some Palestinian children read hate-filled textbooks, watch hate-filled television, and grow up to be terrorists. But this hardly precludes peace and does not truly change the goals and tactics of Palestinian leadership. We have to pay less attention to the kabuki theater of political posturing and more to the actions and interests of the parties involved.
After leaving Sderot, we had a wonderful BBQ on the beach and tried to finally jettison all of our jet lag. The next morning was still a bit dazed but it was certainly better than the reality collapse of the first couple days.
Our day started with a "60 Minutes" segment called "Is Peace Out of Reach?" In it, Bob Simon talks to various Israelis and Palestinians about the peace process, generally outlines the shape of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and visits the West Bank. There are many problems with this piece, particularly Simon's "analysis" of demography and Israel's options in keeping a Jewish majority in the face of a rapidly growing Palestinian minority. The quote speaks for itself:
"Demographers predict that within ten years Arabs will outnumber Jews in Israel, the West Bank and Gaza. Without a separate Palestinian state the Israelis would have three options, none of them good. They could try ethnic cleansing, drive the Palestinians out of the West Bank, or they could give the Palestinians the vote. That would be the democratic option but it would mean the end of the Jewish state. Or they could try apartheid - have the minority Israelis rule the majority Palestinians, but apartheid regimes don’t have a very long life."
This is a ridiculously short, absurd, and incomplete list of Israel's options. My biggest issue is that the demography is incorrect. As of 2008, Israel proper's Arab citizenry comprised about 20% of the nation's total population, and about 12% of the Arab population considers itself Israeli before Arab. It should be pretty clear that Arabs will not be the majority within a single decade, let alone two or three. Therefore, there is a lot of time before any of these "options" become necessary. This kind of demographic fear-mongering is currently popular in Israel and in the US, where racists worry about whites only being the plurality but hardly reflects the reality on the ground. More importantly, this list of options does not illuminate or explain the current situation in any way. All it does is inflame and antagonize.
Israel isn't going to try ethnic cleansing. This "option" has been available through Israel's entire history and after the 1948 War, there hasn't been any movement in that direction. Giving Palestinians the vote would not necessarily mean the end of the Jewish state, particularly if it is coupled with a two state solution, or at least a stabilization of the West Bank. Continued Jewish immigration from outside Israel and the natural growth of Israel's population should render discussions of an apartheid state moot until we are actually at that point decades from now. As an added bonus, Simon fails to mention the state in which Palestinians truly live under an apartheid regime - Jordan, with its ruling Hashemite minority and subjugated Palestinian majority.
If you truly believe that mainstream Israelis would support ethnic cleansing (hint: they wouldn't, and the crazy settlers don't count as mainstream, Bob), then there's not much to talk about. The Israeli settler Simon speaks to early on in the piece represents the far right fringe of the settler movement, which should key you in on how crazy she is. Then, in a neat bit of "balance," Simon finds the most moderate, least representative Palestinian he could find and tries to portray his position as the Palestinian mainstream. I could continue to tear into Simon's superficial and, honestly, unbalanced portrayal of the situation but the bias is evident from that one quote alone. And as those who know me well can attest, I am sick to death of whining about media bias against Israel but it is so obvious here that it cannot be overlooked.
After this somewhat dismal foray into American media, we heard from a representative of Palestinian Media Watch, an ostensible "self portrait of Palestinian society" (quote taken from their old website). PMW analyzes Palestinian society through its media, such as television, academic papers, and maps. The PMW representative (whose name I cannot recall, although she seemed very nice and earnest) showed clips including children's shows from Hamas' state television station and statements from Fatah, PLO, and Hamas leaders.
The bits from children's shows had the most effect on our group; several people audibly responded when the Hamas mascot, modeled after Mickey Mouse, was questioned and murdered by an "Israeli soldier" (an actor, obviously) on live air with a Palestinian child providing commentary. These shows also include game shows in which Palestinian children answer questions like "What is the size of Palestine?" (answer: 27,000 sq. km., the size of all of Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza). Combined with excerpts from Palestinian textbooks, the PMW representative argued that the Palestinians were creating a fictional world without Israel for their children, with the goal of eventually wiping Israel off the map for real.
To further convince us of Fatah and Hamas' true goal of destroying Israel, she continued with clips from various leaders who either rejected Israel's legitimacy, swore to wipe Israel from the map, or drive all the Jews into the sea. This, she said, showed that even at the highest levels of Palestinian leadership, the destruction of Israel and the expulsion of Jews remained the true goal.
I remain skeptical of these assertions. It is common practice for politicians in the Middle East to make all sorts of wild claims (see also: Mahmoud Ahmadinejad) that they cannot enforce and/or do not actually believe. All such declarations must be taken with mountains of salt. Plus, in some negotiations, the weaker your position, the more absurd your demands. Hamas and Fatah do not and will not have the capacity to overcome the IDF and wipe Israel off the map in any conceivable scenario. Once you view all public declarations of Israel's impending doom as simply the strongest position available, they make more sense.
Also, analyzing any political situation through state-controlled media is intrinsically problematic. North Korean media is a great example since it is also state-controlled and borderline insane. While Palestinian officials claim that they're going to destroy Israel, North Korea issues posters like this (source: http://calitreview.com/):
Translation: "When provoking a war of aggression, we will hit back, beginning with the USA!"
While Fatah puts out music videos claiming that Palestine encompasses cities within Israel:
North Korea puts out music videos accusing the US of a variety of crimes and culminates in the Statue of Liberty blowing up:
http://www.robpongi.com/pages/comboFUCKINGUSAHI.html
Obviously, neither reflects reality nor do they reflect what the political leaders actually believe will happen. Kim Jong Il (or his successor) no more believes that North Korea can destroy the US than Mahmoud Abbas believes the Palestinians can destroy Israel. This should be fairly obvious by the actions of such leaders, with North Korea constantly approaching and retreating from the negotiating table and Fatah working with Israel in the West Bank and against Hamas. It's actually in Abbas' best interest for Israel to remain strong or else Hamas would likely destroy Fatah, execute Abbas, and take over the West Bank, a disastrous outcome all around, particularly for Abbas and his family.
It is true that some Palestinian children read hate-filled textbooks, watch hate-filled television, and grow up to be terrorists. But this hardly precludes peace and does not truly change the goals and tactics of Palestinian leadership. We have to pay less attention to the kabuki theater of political posturing and more to the actions and interests of the parties involved.
Friday, August 28, 2009
Sderot
Sderot is a small city located less than a mile east of the northern border of Gaza. The story of Sderot is relatively unknown in the United States although the city's recent history should be famous. Since the beginning of the Second Intifada in October 2000, Sderot has suffered continuous rocket fire. As of January 2008, over 8,000 rockets have landed in Sderot, an average of about 2.4 a day.
At the end of 2006, Sderot's population was about 19,300. Aid organizations estimate that by the end of 2008, about 15-25% of the population left because of the incessant rocket fire. We visited the town after lunch at the Air Force base.
It is difficult to write about Sderot without becoming overly maudlin or over-correcting into dryness. I will try my best to stick to the facts without injecting too much of my emotions into the picture.
At first glance, Sderot seems like any normal Israeli city. However, the sameness evaporates the moment you see a fortified bus stop or a house with a bomb shelter added on like an extra garage. After our bus wound its way through the narrow streets and finally stopped, we saw a presentation from a group dedicated to showing the world the truth about life in Sderot. We saw footage of a man levering the remains of a Qassam rocket from the ground only a few meters away from a school. We learned about the warning system which gives citizens an average of 15 seconds to find shelter before a rocket lands. We learned that Hamas has fired over 200 rockets at Sderot since the end of Operation Cast Lead and during an ostensible cease-fire period. Then, we went to the police station and saw the remains of Qassam rockets.
The rockets are generally built out of readily available materials such as welded pieces of scrap metal and pipes. Some of these materials actually come from aid packages sent into Gaza. Like the IEDs used in Iraq, the rockets are filled with explosives and small bits of metal. When the rocket hits something and explodes, the bits of metal are expelled outwards with great force, becoming shrapnel. Any unprotected person within a few dozen yards of the explosion will suffer significant, possibly deadly injuries.
Upon close inspection, I was able to make out the markings on the rockets. Most were green, the color of Hamas. A few were yellow, however, the color of Fatah. The welding was often crude and some appeared shoddily made. Still, such rockets have killed 25 Israelis and injured over 700 more.
The Israeli government has spent hundreds of millions of dollars fortifying Sderot. The schools all have bomb shelters including rooftop barriers designed to withstand a direct hit. They are still trying to find enough money to complete these shelters but their efforts have helped keep casualties down.
The most emotional part of the trip came when we got back in the bus and drove past a playground. This is what we saw:
(Thanks to Dave Fuchs for posting these on Facebook; they're much better than my iPhone pictures.)
As you've probably guessed, the caterpillars are bomb shelters for children. When the alarm sounds, the children have an easily accessible and, hopefully, psychologically comforting place to hide until the rocket attack ends. Post-traumatic stress disorders are fairly common among children in Sderot although, as our guide mentioned, the "post" doesn't apply since rockets and mortars continue to fall.
We took a brief bathroom break and walked up a hill overlooking Gaza. Late in the afternoon, Gaza is hazy; it was difficult to see very far due to the smoke and pollution rising from the buildings. It reminded me of a painting I used as a computer desktop for years called "Desolation." It is dusky blue, the ruined landscape of a city decimated by war. The husk of something that used to be beautiful.
Most journalism focusing on the Arab-Israeli conflict talks about the physical damage done to people and places. It deals with body counts, homes demolished, and rockets fired. Through this lens, Gaza is a perfect example of Palestinian suffering; its inhabitants are poor, the buildings crumbling, and the body count high. The story of Sderot is hard to tell because it doesn't fit this narrative. The town is seemingly nice, the buildings well maintained, and the people relatively well off.
It is the caterpillars that tell the story of Israeli suffering over these past years. The people of Sderot don't die in large numbers or fire rockets or do much of anything other than try to live normal, simple lives. But they can't live peacefully because rockets fall on their homes, their synagogues, their schools, and their playgrounds. Sometimes the rockets don't come for days or weeks or months at a time. Sometimes over a dozen fall in a single day. But you never know when the next one is going to fall. You don't know if you really have 15 seconds to get to shelter, or 10, or 5. All you can do is run and hope that you make it in time, and that your friends and family do the same.
That is the face of Israeli suffering. It is the silent suffering of those who cannot be safe because others do not want them to be safe. It is the suffering of those whose mere existence is enough to trigger murderous hatred in others. Hamas cannot overcome the IDF and kill the citizens of Sderot. But Hamas can induce fear. Deep, corrosive fear. Fear that causes adults to build bomb shelters in playgrounds. Fear that causes intense trauma in children that manifests itself as bed-wetting, agoraphobia, and slowed mental development. That is the goal of terrorism. And that is another reason why such attacks must stop.
One last note: While we were looking at the Qassam rockets, a car alarm went off for a split second before the vehicle's owner turned it off. Our guide, a former American who made aliyah just over a year ago, reacted instantly; he flinched, ducked down, and looked for cover instinctively. Only a few of us noticed because he straightened quickly and continued informing us about the rockets. Most of us didn't even remember hearing the alarm and didn't react at all. But our guide did. And he had only lived there for a year.
At the end of 2006, Sderot's population was about 19,300. Aid organizations estimate that by the end of 2008, about 15-25% of the population left because of the incessant rocket fire. We visited the town after lunch at the Air Force base.
It is difficult to write about Sderot without becoming overly maudlin or over-correcting into dryness. I will try my best to stick to the facts without injecting too much of my emotions into the picture.
At first glance, Sderot seems like any normal Israeli city. However, the sameness evaporates the moment you see a fortified bus stop or a house with a bomb shelter added on like an extra garage. After our bus wound its way through the narrow streets and finally stopped, we saw a presentation from a group dedicated to showing the world the truth about life in Sderot. We saw footage of a man levering the remains of a Qassam rocket from the ground only a few meters away from a school. We learned about the warning system which gives citizens an average of 15 seconds to find shelter before a rocket lands. We learned that Hamas has fired over 200 rockets at Sderot since the end of Operation Cast Lead and during an ostensible cease-fire period. Then, we went to the police station and saw the remains of Qassam rockets.
The rockets are generally built out of readily available materials such as welded pieces of scrap metal and pipes. Some of these materials actually come from aid packages sent into Gaza. Like the IEDs used in Iraq, the rockets are filled with explosives and small bits of metal. When the rocket hits something and explodes, the bits of metal are expelled outwards with great force, becoming shrapnel. Any unprotected person within a few dozen yards of the explosion will suffer significant, possibly deadly injuries.
Upon close inspection, I was able to make out the markings on the rockets. Most were green, the color of Hamas. A few were yellow, however, the color of Fatah. The welding was often crude and some appeared shoddily made. Still, such rockets have killed 25 Israelis and injured over 700 more.
The Israeli government has spent hundreds of millions of dollars fortifying Sderot. The schools all have bomb shelters including rooftop barriers designed to withstand a direct hit. They are still trying to find enough money to complete these shelters but their efforts have helped keep casualties down.
The most emotional part of the trip came when we got back in the bus and drove past a playground. This is what we saw:
As you've probably guessed, the caterpillars are bomb shelters for children. When the alarm sounds, the children have an easily accessible and, hopefully, psychologically comforting place to hide until the rocket attack ends. Post-traumatic stress disorders are fairly common among children in Sderot although, as our guide mentioned, the "post" doesn't apply since rockets and mortars continue to fall.
We took a brief bathroom break and walked up a hill overlooking Gaza. Late in the afternoon, Gaza is hazy; it was difficult to see very far due to the smoke and pollution rising from the buildings. It reminded me of a painting I used as a computer desktop for years called "Desolation." It is dusky blue, the ruined landscape of a city decimated by war. The husk of something that used to be beautiful.
Most journalism focusing on the Arab-Israeli conflict talks about the physical damage done to people and places. It deals with body counts, homes demolished, and rockets fired. Through this lens, Gaza is a perfect example of Palestinian suffering; its inhabitants are poor, the buildings crumbling, and the body count high. The story of Sderot is hard to tell because it doesn't fit this narrative. The town is seemingly nice, the buildings well maintained, and the people relatively well off.
It is the caterpillars that tell the story of Israeli suffering over these past years. The people of Sderot don't die in large numbers or fire rockets or do much of anything other than try to live normal, simple lives. But they can't live peacefully because rockets fall on their homes, their synagogues, their schools, and their playgrounds. Sometimes the rockets don't come for days or weeks or months at a time. Sometimes over a dozen fall in a single day. But you never know when the next one is going to fall. You don't know if you really have 15 seconds to get to shelter, or 10, or 5. All you can do is run and hope that you make it in time, and that your friends and family do the same.
That is the face of Israeli suffering. It is the silent suffering of those who cannot be safe because others do not want them to be safe. It is the suffering of those whose mere existence is enough to trigger murderous hatred in others. Hamas cannot overcome the IDF and kill the citizens of Sderot. But Hamas can induce fear. Deep, corrosive fear. Fear that causes adults to build bomb shelters in playgrounds. Fear that causes intense trauma in children that manifests itself as bed-wetting, agoraphobia, and slowed mental development. That is the goal of terrorism. And that is another reason why such attacks must stop.
One last note: While we were looking at the Qassam rockets, a car alarm went off for a split second before the vehicle's owner turned it off. Our guide, a former American who made aliyah just over a year ago, reacted instantly; he flinched, ducked down, and looked for cover instinctively. Only a few of us noticed because he straightened quickly and continued informing us about the rockets. Most of us didn't even remember hearing the alarm and didn't react at all. But our guide did. And he had only lived there for a year.
Saturday, August 22, 2009
A few replies and the first speaker analysis (Pinchas Inbari)
To reply to Shalom: The ethnic cleansing I speak of consists of a massacre of over 100 Arabs at Deir Yassin during Plan Dalet along with various other events. Haganah, Palmach, and Irgun conquered several cities including Haifa and Acre, with the result of over 250,000 displaced Arabs. There were also instances of Jewish terrorism, including the December 30th bombing in Haifa in which Irgun members threw two bombs into a crowd of Arab workers, killing 6 and injuring 42. Of course, this part of a larger scenario of attacks and reprisals by both sides, often against civilian targets. Neither the Palestinians (a term I am using here for simplicity, although your point is well taken) nor the Israelis are blameless since both sides targeted and killed civilians. You already did a good job of noting Arab violence against Jews during that period so I'll leave others to read your comments :)
Anyway, on to the speaker analysis. After we arrived in Israel, we had a short stop at the Tomb of Samuel (Nebe Samuel) where we got to know each other and ate a small snack. Summer in Israel is much different than winter; while the weather during my Birthright trip this February was occasionally hot, summer heat is stifling. We checked into our somewhat grubby hotel in Jerusalem and tried to sleep off our jet lag.
The next morning, we woke early, ate breakfast, then took a bus to our first speaker, Pinchas Inbari, a journalist and Palestinian affairs analyst.. This talk was titled "Palestinian Political Culture" and it generally lived up to its name. Mr. Inbari was obviously very knowledge; unfortunately, his English was not strong which did not work well with his tendency to ramble. He did manage to give a decent if fragmented account of the histories of Fatah, Hamas, and the PLO (for more background on this, Wikipedia is a decent source. Really.).
In his view, Fatah is willing to negotiate for peace despite its continued non-recognition of Israel and terror attacks. Unfortunately, a willingness to negotiate is not enough. Any Palestinian political entity worth negotiating with must be able to enforce any agreements reached. Right now, none exists since Hamas controls Gaza and Fatah controls the West Bank. Even if peace could be achieved with Fatah, Hamas would not recognize it, thus perpetuating the violence.
Mr. Inbari also highlighted the fact that Israel presented generous offers at Camp David and later, Taba, all of which were rejected. There is significant contention over exactly how good these offers were when all of the details were taken into account but it does show that reasonable negotiations are possible. Unfortunately, those talks fell apart although the exact reason (either Palestinian refusal to negotiate in good faith or unreasonable Israeli demands depending on your POV) is still disputed. Mr. Pinchas also emphasized that most Israelis and Palestinians today do want peace; the conflict is over the shape of that peace. This is important to keep in mind as the analysis moves forward.
On a sidenote, there were points were our group's leader, Yitzhak Sokoloff, took over the lecture and provided his own thoughts on the topic. At first, I thought this was likely an isolated incident arising from Mr. Pinchas' halting, rambling English. However, Yitzhak overstepped his bounds at several other points during the trip. I will talk more about that at the end of the speaker analysis section but it is something to remember when I mention the bias toward the Israeli right inherent in the trip and its selection of speakers.
Anyway, on to the speaker analysis. After we arrived in Israel, we had a short stop at the Tomb of Samuel (Nebe Samuel) where we got to know each other and ate a small snack. Summer in Israel is much different than winter; while the weather during my Birthright trip this February was occasionally hot, summer heat is stifling. We checked into our somewhat grubby hotel in Jerusalem and tried to sleep off our jet lag.
The next morning, we woke early, ate breakfast, then took a bus to our first speaker, Pinchas Inbari, a journalist and Palestinian affairs analyst.. This talk was titled "Palestinian Political Culture" and it generally lived up to its name. Mr. Inbari was obviously very knowledge; unfortunately, his English was not strong which did not work well with his tendency to ramble. He did manage to give a decent if fragmented account of the histories of Fatah, Hamas, and the PLO (for more background on this, Wikipedia is a decent source. Really.).
In his view, Fatah is willing to negotiate for peace despite its continued non-recognition of Israel and terror attacks. Unfortunately, a willingness to negotiate is not enough. Any Palestinian political entity worth negotiating with must be able to enforce any agreements reached. Right now, none exists since Hamas controls Gaza and Fatah controls the West Bank. Even if peace could be achieved with Fatah, Hamas would not recognize it, thus perpetuating the violence.
Mr. Inbari also highlighted the fact that Israel presented generous offers at Camp David and later, Taba, all of which were rejected. There is significant contention over exactly how good these offers were when all of the details were taken into account but it does show that reasonable negotiations are possible. Unfortunately, those talks fell apart although the exact reason (either Palestinian refusal to negotiate in good faith or unreasonable Israeli demands depending on your POV) is still disputed. Mr. Pinchas also emphasized that most Israelis and Palestinians today do want peace; the conflict is over the shape of that peace. This is important to keep in mind as the analysis moves forward.
On a sidenote, there were points were our group's leader, Yitzhak Sokoloff, took over the lecture and provided his own thoughts on the topic. At first, I thought this was likely an isolated incident arising from Mr. Pinchas' halting, rambling English. However, Yitzhak overstepped his bounds at several other points during the trip. I will talk more about that at the end of the speaker analysis section but it is something to remember when I mention the bias toward the Israeli right inherent in the trip and its selection of speakers.
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